THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OIL REVENUE ACCOUNTING AND FISCAL ALLOCATION DISPUTES IN NIGERIA’S FOURTH REPUBLIC

Abstract

Nigeria as a resource-rich country relies hugely on oil revenues for her sustenance. One of the major contentious items in her federal structure is the revenue sharing and allocation formula. Having been the primary issue in her political stability as a nation, none of the formulae evolved at various times in almost six decades of nationhood has gained general acceptability among the federating units. This paper examines how the management of Nigeria’s oil revenues has been implicated in the recurring fiscal allocation disputes in the country since the advent of the fourth republic. Relying on the rentier state theory, the paper highlights the various disputes between and among the states, and between the states and the central government. It recommends a revisiting of the law which gives the central government enormous powers, to the detriment of oil-host communities and others who should be direct beneficiaries of Nigeria’s oil wealth.