THE QUICK, AND SLOW, MARCH OF DEMOCRACY IN SUB- SAHARAN AFRICA

By
EDDY AKPOMERA, Ph.D
Department of Political Science,
University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria
E-mail: eddyakpomera@yahoo.com
Tel: 234 803 348 5535

&

KINGSLEY UFUOMA OMOYIBO, Ph.D
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria
E-mail: kingsley.omoyibo@uniben.edu
Tel: 234-803 354 2467

ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War in the international community saw the sprouting of the tree of liberal democracy in sub – Saharan African countries planted by the Western capitals through the Bretton Woods institutions' political conditionalities embedded in the economic packages. The growth of democracy has now become stunted in the sub-region with the emergence of new generation of despots wearing democratic garbs. This paper has periscoped the emerging trends in the democratic experience, the crisis of democratic transitions and spread of hybrid regimes. Majority of the multi – ethnic countries have traits of democracy, but they actually qualify for pseudo – democratic regimes without deep – rooted observance of political rights and unencumbered opposition. A policy implication is how to galvanize the civil society in the sub-region towards the arduous task of mobilizing the citizenry to rescue the democratic practices from the grip of pseudo – democratic regimes in the sub-region.
Key Words: Democracy, Sub – Saharan Africa, Politics, Economics, Elite, Regimes

1.0.Introduction

African democratic experience, South of the Sahara, with the high density of black population in the world, is a study of the quick sands of the ruling elite politics and power relations. It is only in the sub – region, in a 21st century democratic election declared free, fair and credible by the national umpire and international observers, that

the political nuances of President Yahaya Jammeh of The Gambia could take place. The presidential elections in the West African country of the The Gambia held in December 2016 produced a winner in Adama Barrow, the opposition leader, who defeated the incumbent President Jammeh that had ruled the West African country for 22 years (Vanguard, 2017). The incumbent publicly conceded defeat, in a national broadcast, and the sub-region celebrated the potential smooth political transition which Gambians had not seen since independence. However, 96 hours later, President Jammeh dramatically rejected the entire results of the elections as the will of the Gambian people, and vowed not to leave office. In a defiant political move, President Jammeh petitioned the one – judge Supreme Court to annul the entire election to pave way for his continuation in office. The planned political death knell on the wish of the Gambians has resulted in two strategic moves in the West African sub-region. First, was the ECOWAS diplomatic intervention by Heads of State and Government, led by President Muhammadu Buhari, which failed, prompting the ECOWAS Chairman, to put the West African Security Force, a regional defence outfit, on red alert to possibly intervene in The Gambia to restore the will of the people, if the incumbent President stay beyond its tenure elapsing January 19, 2017. The second was the approval of neighbouring Senegal to host the head of the Independent Electoral Commission who have fled the country following intense pressure to cancel the election results and threat to his life by security agents of The Gambia (Vanguard, 2017).

The political tension in The Gambia contrasts sharply, in the same West African sub-region, with the presidential election held in Ghana, with similar results, where the incumbent President John Mahama was defeated by the major opposition candidate, Nana Akufo – Adodo. The political atmosphere in Ghana is peaceful as the incumbent President displayed the political culture of democrats by publicly conceding defeat and congratulated the President – elect. The political move was hailed in the same ECOWAS sub- region as an example of respect for democracy and constitutional rule (Ghana Star, 2016). The Ghanaian democratic experience and smooth political transition was preceded by same examples of Nigeria in 2015 where the then incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan was defeated by the opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari; and in landlocked Zambia, in Southern African sub-region, in 1991, with the electoral expulsion of the incumbent President Kenneth Kaunda who had ruled the country since political independence in 1964; and a few other countries. However, the political culture to respect the constitutional provisions and ensure smooth political transitions is in deficit in East, Centraland Southern African sub – region with incumbent political leadership clinging to power. Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda is one of the longest – serving in the African continent, having stayed in power for 31 years. Museveni, along with other incumbent Presidents of

Congo Brazzavile (Denis SassonNguesso) and Rwanda (Paul Kagame) in 2016 brazenly induced their countries' parliamentariansto change the constitutions to remove the clause on two terms limit as President of their individual countries. President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo indicated a similar interest on limitless tenure in office but bowed to pressure from civil society and international community to respect the constitution, and agreed to vacate office in 2017 (Guardian of London, 2016). Such pressures have been ineffective in the case of 92 – year old President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who has no exit plans from office after being in the saddle for 37 years. In all cases, the sit tight Presidents have unleashed state violence on the opposition elements, the civil society and the mass media. This paper is focused on the analysis of the emerging trends of the democratic scenario in sub – Saharan Africa, and the key features of the democratic behavior of the ruling elite in furtherance of their political interests supposedly under the canopy of liberal democracy

Democratic Perspectives

The concept of democracy revolves around the idea of political rulership dictated by the wish of majority of the people, in order to protect and promote the rights, interests and welfare of the citizenry. The critical issue of political freedom has three popular themes of rule by the people through free and fair elections dictated by universal adult suffrage in order to confer legitimacy on governments at all levels; the strong input of constitutionalism to limit government power, infuse terms of office for public office holders and protection of fundamental human rights; as well as the guarantee of the freedom of expression, choice of political platforms, association, and the press (Centre for Civic Education, 2016). As lofty as the notion of democracy may seem, it is not cheap to implement in every society or country, and those that benefit from the political systemwere largely the elite or the propertied class. Plamenatz (1973) put forward three major defining elements in the practice of democracy in most countries, namely: where there are inequalities in wealth, then political power and influence will most certainly be dominated by the economic class at all levels of governance; in modern societies where the political system operates large organizations, political power and influence revolve around their leaders or key operators, instead of the working class; and in modern societies with great social inequalities, leaders who hitherto had modest social origins, soon acquire political and social attitude of the privileged class and steadily distance themselves from the electorates or the working class. Most liberal democracies (except the United Kingdom, the State of Israel, and New Zealand) have written constitutions as the grundnorm of government which are usually framed in the name of the citizens of the countries, but operationalizing the

fundamental document is always structured in ways to give room for class character, and in the long run, serve the interests of the political, economic and feudal elite. Modern democracy, especially the electoral aspects, involves funds in operations, and confers advantage on the socio – economic elite in the various countries it is practiced (Appadorai, 2004)

No doubt, modern societies are dichotomized into the minority propertied class who rule, or influence the choice of occupants of such political offices, and the majority working or middle class who are less endowed with resources and constitute the bulk of the electorates. Arising from the benefits of power and influence, the political elite in liberal democracies emphasize the essentiality of stability and equilibrium in order to perpetuate the power relations in the polity, which gives credence to the radical perspective of liberal democracy as political system that thrives on the manipulation of the propertied elite who are usually united in the protection and promotion of their class interest (Lenin, 1917). In Africa, the pattern of political behavior of the ruling class gives credence to the fact that the continent was at the mercy of local colonization and throes of democratic liberation struggle from local political elite. Abia (2008) offered the political colouration of prevailing practices of democracy in the African continent to include political instability resulting from lingering crisis of legitimacy of various regimes and poor national integration of the citizenry; widespread corruption in rentier economies promoted by the competitive primitive acquisitive tendencies of the political and economic elite; a culture of political violence by the leaders in their schemes to subvert the will of the people in the electoral processes which triggers resistance of the citizens through street protests and defiance to state authorities; and the deployment of ethnic, regional and religious platforms in the parochial struggle for the commonwealth for their private interests in an atmosphere of prevailing poverty and underdevelopment.

Until the wave of political independence swept through the African continent in the 20th Century, except for Egypt, Liberia, Ethiopia and South Africa, the vast landmass of agricultural and mineral resources – rich area had been colonized, at various times, by seven foreign powers – Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Germany and Italy. Thus, at independence, majority of the 53 independent member states of the African Union had sought new identity as nation-states in terms of statehood, as the different countries were characterized by ethnic, social and linguistically – divergent peoples within national boundaries. On the economic turf, the African countries had the preponderance of state – run economies and underdeveloped private sector with agricultural and mineral produce that have been at the mercy of the Western capitals in determining the international prices of such products. Tordoff (2002) posits that the personalization of political power started in

the 1960s when Sub – Saharan African countries started shifting towards single party system and emergence of military dictatorship, in which there was heavy concentration of powers in the office of the head of state, the fusion of the leaders' own thoughts into the official ideology, and the absence of political succession plan. The supplanting of corrupt civilian administration with military regimes did not connote "a change in the class content of power" (Sklar, 1979), as it was simply the musical chairs of the elite group. Under the guise of national interest, the military juntas were strong institutions of their own, or instruments in the hands of ethnic elite, with the mission to either promote its interest or be the platform to create a new network of patronage to alter or maintain the power relationsin the different countries.

The upsurge in the demand for liberal democracy, denominated largely in competitive multi – party political structure, was quick-paced in Sub – Saharan African, and it was driven from three flanks. First, there was the sudden collapse of the socialist ideology, along with the cessation of the hostilities of the Cold War, on the world stage. The situation encouraged the disintegration of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) with the strong appeal of political freedom, especially democratic governance and economic liberalization, expressed in the principles of *glasnost* and *perestroika.* The serious consequence for many African countries was the sudden loss of ideological base for political development and channel for continuous flow of foreign aid for economic sustenance. Second, there were serious social disenchantment and economic recession, coupled with incidents of droughts and political instability, resulting in the upswing in unemployment, declining purchasing power and hunger. The socio – economic crisis in the region gave impetus to the demand for new method of choosing the political leadership to replace the variantsof authoritarianism expressed in single party system or military regimes. Third, the introduction of political conditionalities – political freedom, multi–party democratic elections, respect for human rights and good governance –encapsulated in the economic liberalization packages of the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and IMF), was bolstered by the Western capitalist countries. Most of the sub-Saharan African countries already economies that were comatose and weak in the international community, and quickly need the financial elixir of the global financial institutions, which directed the structural adjustment of the economy in the region, by demanding the retrenchment of the state from the provision of social services and welfare programmes, while the citizens pay more for services in all ramifications. The weak and shadow states (Reno, 1995) accepted the political conditionality of liberal democracy, and worked hard in drawing up new constitutions and holding multi-party elections across the continent, south of the Sahara. "Political conditionalities could be regarded as the programme of an alliance, comprising international financial

institutions, seeking to bring about the capitalist transformation of African economies; Western government flexing their diplomatic muscles in the aftermath of the Cold War; Western public opinions, outraged at the brutality and corruption of at least a significant number of African regimes; and finally, at least vicariously, the African publics who were voiceferously demonstrating their own discontent with the existing (political) order, and on whose behalf, the Western aid donors could claim (often misleading) to speak" (Clapham, 1997).

The growing agitation locally and internationally for multi-party political structure, in the milieu of socio – economic crisis in the region,led to the exit of dictators such as Mengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopia) in 1991; Mobutu SeseSeko (old Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo) in 1997; the first – ever multi – race elections in South Africa in 1994; multi-party elections in Cote D'Ivoire in 1990; Benin Republic and Zambia in 1991; Kenya in 1992; Tanzania in 1995; Ghana in 1996; and Nigeria in 1999. Since 1991, sub – Saharan Africa has had 36 presidential elections in which new leadership emerged through the ballot box. (The Economist, 2016)

2.0.Slippery Paths of Democracy in Africa

The landmarks of democracy are the promotion and protection of political rights, civil liberties, constitutional rule, independent judiciary, unbiased electoral umpire, and freedom of the mass media. Deploying these basic elements of democracy in sub – Saharan Africa would assist, to a reasonable extent, to periscope regimes that have deliberately encouraged, a state policy, the practice of democracy; those that are hybrid regimes, that is, combining democratic traits like regular and direct elections with variants of authoritarianism such as political oppression and emasculation of other institutions of government and elections; and those that parade deliberate human rights abuse of constitutional provisions and judiciary. The Institute for Security Studies and the Freedom House (2016) report that, in sub – Saharan Africa, the population of citizens living under regimes that are "Not Free" (preponderance of anti – democratic practices) stood at 379 million or 38.2 per cent); "Partly Free" (hybrid regimes) were about 497 million or 50.2 per cent; and "Free" (preponderance for democratic practices as state policy) were about 115 million or 11.6 per cent.The countries adjudged "Not Free" were Sudan, South Sudan, Mauritania, Chad, Eritrea, Djibouti, The Gambia, Cameroun, Central African Republic; Ethiopia, Gabon, Equitorial Guinea, Congo – Brazzaville, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Somalia, Angola and Swaziland. Those labeled "Partly Free" included Kenya, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone,Cote D'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho, Madagascar, Comoros,

Somaliland, and Seychelles. The few countries labeled as "Free" were Cape Verde, Senegal, Ghana, Benin Republic, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa and Mauritius. From the categorization, and the listing of countries in that regard, the sub – regional distribution indicates that the Central African sub – region has the highest number of countries that have traits of anti – democratic practices in heavy doses. The East and West African sub – region have many hybrid regimes with elements of pseudo – democracy in which the incumbents utilize the state resources and political power to influence the electoral process and attempt to emasculate the strength of the opposition, and arm – twist state institutions, especially the electoral umpire and the judiciary, through appointments and funding, to lose their sense of independence. Southern and West African sub- region have the same number of democratically – inclined states.

Table 1: Sub – Saharan Distribution of Countries with Democratic Categorization

Sub – Region	"Free"	"Partly Free"	"Not Free"
East Africa	Nil	10	7
West Africa	4	10	2
Central Africa	Nil	Nil	9
Southern Africa	4	1	1
Total	8	21	19

Source: Adapted from the Institute for Security Studies and Freedom House (2016)

However, it is imperative to point out that this broad political categorization of Sub – Saharan states with variants of democratic practices as state policy does not take into account the varied economic, social and cultural contexts of each country that could have significant inputs into the political culture of the states. Definitely, the interplay of socio – cultural and economic factors with the political process, multi-party formation, national integration and development of the mass media in each country may indicate the level of acceptance and cost of operations of democracy as a political system.

In Sub – Saharan Africa, there has been more cases of deliberate attempts to build father – son political dynasties. This is critically indicated in the class definition of the societies, the attempts of the incumbents to continue the corrupt exploitation of the state resources whenever they leave office, and the refusal of incumbents to build a strong network of statesmen and middle class that could aspire to leadership at the national level. In the West African Sub – region, two cases of such political dynasty could be identified – the President of Gabon, Ali Bongo Ondinda, who was elected in 2009, is the scion of the Bongo Ondinda who was in power from independence in

1967 till 2009; and President of Togo, Faure Essozimna, was elected in 2005, following the demise of his father, GnassingbeEyadema, who also ruled the country since independence in 1960. In East Africa, the incumbent president of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta is the son of Late Jomo Kenyatta who governed the country for many years after independence. In Central Africa, the incumbent President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Joseph Kabila, is the son of Late Laurent Desire Kabila, and the family has held on to political power since independence. In Southern Africa, the President of Botswana, Ian Khama, is the son of Sir SeretseKhama who was its pioneer leader (Odunayo, 2016).

An emerging trend in the democratic experience in the Sub – Saharan region is the assault on the grundnorm of democratic rule, the Constitution. In East, Central and West Africa, various regimes have aggressively altered the term limits on the office of the President earlier enshrined in the Constitution in order to perpetuate the incumbents stay in office. The political desperation for personalization of power is evident in Uganda, Burundi, Congo – Brazzaville, Rwanda, and the efforts being made in the Congo. In all cases, the regimes have unleashed a reign of terror on the opposition and the civil society, utilizing the instruments of state power. The issue of term limits has been imperative in liberal democratic practices across the world as it has the elements of ensuring the political freedom of voters, at regular intervals, to elect their preferred political leaders; it de – personalizes key public offices to guarantee its essence of collective ownership of the citizenry; it creates ample room for political accountability as incumbents, in seeking re – election or fresh mandate after the first term in office (of specified number of years), the electorates, in principle, could evaluate the performances of the regime in power; and it gives liberal democracy its verve and vitality at periodic intervals in the citizens' exercise of their political rights and enthusiasm, with prospects of regime change.These critical advantages of term limits in democratic practices are seriously under threat as it was almost 30 years ago when authoritarian single party and military rule dominated the African political landscape. Clapham (1997) argued that the states with less institutionalized tendencies usually have precarious economy, and makes more room for personalization of political power and privatization of diplomacy to the countries' external environment.

The emerging trend of no - definite term limit of the occupant of the office of the President in some countries has the connivance of the parliamentarians, and it is given synergy by the elite in such societies as they wield both political power and economic wealth. The elite, within the context of power relations, have always strived for the maintenance of the status quo and stability of the prevailing system that promotes their interest. Many African countries are being sustained on the rentier economic

threshold, making the political leaders and economic elite beneficiaries of the royalties from foreign exploiters of mineral resources. This situation has always made politics the apian way to easy riches, as patronages distributed by the political elite sustain the party system, and keeps away the emergence of a strong middle class in the socio – political milieu.

The personalization of political power is given further characterization by the zero – sum game in electoral contest that thrives on strong ethnic or tribal support. The Sub – Saharan region is a maze of multi – ethnic groups. With the weak institutions and poor political culture dominating the region, political contests sharply divide the citizenry along ethnic or tribal lines, rather than policy differentiation. Collier (2016) was of the opinion that political contest in the region had strong colouration of the deployment of state power and resources by the incumbent to maintain the status quo as it is seen as contest of ethnic groups within the national framework. In the face of political opposition, regimes fall back on emotional appeals to tribal, regional and religious loyalties, as the tribal, regional or religious leaders see the regimes as representing their interests, while the opposition struggles, also with such appeals, is in the mould of creating opportunity for "our turn to eat" (The Economist, 2016) within the tribal and religious elite.

Liberal democracy, as a variant of modern political system, did not evolve from the political culture of black Africans, rather it was a Western imposition on African regimes. Many of them, desperate for financial elixir for development and arrest the socio – economic crisis in their countries, turned to the Bretton Wood institutions in the 1980s and 1990s for succor, and had to accept the pre-condition of multy-party system of elections. However, there seems to be reduced Western pressure on African oppressive regimes as Western capitals have shifted their priorities from being watchdog of liberal democracy to fighting the spread of terrorism in the globe. The Western nations have pursued the core national interest of national survival as paramount, and have deployed attention and resources in this regard. The international community is also pre-occupied by this task, and after – effect it has created in violence, irregular migration, refugees, and economic recession. The international community, even the Western nations, in seeking collective efforts of states to tackle the spread and intensity of terrorism, has played down non – participation of undemocratic regimes in contributing funds, troops, intelligence and military hardware in this regard. It is important to mention that, following the eclipse of USSR as a channel of foreign aid to Sub – Saharan Africa, the emergence of China as a development partner for most poor African regimes has no political conditionalities tied to the economic packages.

3.0.Conclusion

The quick, and then slow, growth of democratic practices in the Sub – Saharan region is denominated by proportional slow growth of institutions like the electoral umpire, the judiciary, the civil service and the mass media. The public bureaucracies, especially the armed forces and legal establishments are corrupted and swayed to the defence of sit – tight and oppressive regimes, which deploy the carrot of patronage to secure support. The crises of poverty and tribal loyalties, as well as religious sentiments, have helped regimes to stultify the strengthening of institutions to promote liberal democracy. In The Gambia, for instance, the head of the electoral commission fled the country in December 2016 after announcing the presidential election results, following alleged threats to his life by state agents (Vanguard, 2016), while the parliaments and the superior courts in Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda and Congo-Brazzaville voted in favour of dropping term limits. As one of the countries categorized as having the preponderance for democratic practices, an evidence of emerging strong legal institution was the South Africa high court ruling against the incumbent President Zuma in alleged corruption charges, and ordered to refund public funds utilized for his private residence (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2016).

No doubt, the observance of such democratic elements of political freedom, credible and fair elections, rule of law, political accountability, strong civil society, freedom of expression and the mass media, as well as social justice are in short supply. The spectacle of street protests in many capitals in the region indicates the growing discontent of the citizenry with oppressive and corrupt regimes. On the face value, majority of the multi – ethnic countries have traits of democracy, but they actually qualify for pseudo – democratic regimes without deep – rooted observance of political rights and unencumbered opposition. Thus, the political experience has been the high visibility of electoral smoke, and lesser real fire of democratic practices.

Within the class structure of the African Society, the power relations have been sustained by the propertied class or elite in order to perpetuate their parochial interests. The path of social change is created by the strong will of the civil society and politically – conscious middle class. The Arab Spring in the northern African sub – region which started in Tunisia have shown a strong example of the strength of peoples' revolt and civil society networking. The civil society is a crucial element in the pursuit and sustenance of liberal democracy. The civil society is distinct as a wide range of associations and other organized collectives capable of operating independently of the state, voluntary, self – generating, bound by a set of shared rules and seen as an intermediary entity standing between the citizens and the state (Diamond, 1999; Mutfang, 2000). Although the strength of the civil society in every country is a product of the level of political consciousness of its citizenry, the shared

interest to be pursued and level of networking, civil societies, generally, serve certain important roles in the political space, namely: provide channels of information to galvanize the citizens in the pursuit and defence of shared values and interests; stimulate political participation and civil obligations of the citizenry; ensure the widening of the political space by recruiting members nationally and serve as a bridge to divisive ethnic or religious tendencies; serve as watchdog on regimes' excesses in human rights' abuses, lack of political accountability and extra-judicial irregularities by security forces; serve as platform for vulnerable groups like the physically – challenged, women and ethnic minorities; and ensure free and fair elections through the monitoring of the electoral processes and enlightenment of the citizenry (Emime, 2000).

The march towards political freedom and democratic practices in the Sub – Saharan Africa definitely needs a strong civil society in each country to demand greater political accountability and respect of the constitution from the ruling elite. A strong civil societycan weld inter – ethnic consciousness for the pursuit of good governance and demand for stronger institutions. In the wake of the bitter ethnic and religious rivalries in most countries, the civil society stands a strong chance of raising a national outlook for political campaigns, de – tribalize electoral appeals and opposition to corrupt and oppressive regimes. Besides, a strong civil society in each country has the potential of breaking the ceiling for the emergence of a vibrant middle class by demanding the widening of the ambience of production and equitable distribution of resources for development of all strata of the society. In the 20th Century, liberal democracy in Sub – Saharan Africa was externally driven. In the 21st century, the task has fallen on the domestic social forces, especially the civil society, to wake up to the current realities and demand for more political freedom and accountability from the ruling elite. It should be seen as a liberation struggle from emerging African despots wearing democratic garbs, and engaged with same fervor that went into the political struggle against external colonizers.

REFERENCES

Abia Victor (2008). Understanding Nigerian Government and Politics, Lagos: Gofafresh Publications

Appadorai A. (2004). The Substance of Politics, Oxford: University Press

BBC (2016). SA Judge finds Jacob Zuma should face Corruption Charges, April 4, retrieved fromwww.bbc.com/news/world

Centre for Civic Education (2016). Elements of Democracy, www.civiced.org/resource

Clapham Christopher (1997). Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge: University Press

Collier Paul (2016) quoted in The Economist (2016). London, August 20 – 26, Vol. 420 (9003) p. 28

Diamond L. (1990). Rethinking Civil Society towards Democratic Consolidation, Crossword, Vol. 1 (3), February, Lagos: United States information Service

Emime F. (2000). "The Role of Civil Society in Nigeria," Journal of Democracy, Vol. IX (2), p. 29 – 42

Ghana Star (2016). "Ghana Elections: I'll handover a Peaceful Ghana to My Successor" retrieved from https://www.ghanastar.com

Guardian of London (2016). "Kabila agrees to vacate office," retrieved from www.guardianoflondon.com

Institute for Security Studies & Freedom House (2016). Africa Futures Paper 19 by Jackie Cilliers, October, retrieved from https://issafricaS3.amazonaws/site

LakemfaOwie (2016)."The banana peels of The Gambia" Vanguard, December 30, p. 31

Lenin, V. I. (1917). The State and Revolution, quoted in Mahajan V. D., Political Theory, New Delhi:S. Chand & Company Ltd.

Mutfang P. (2000). "The State, Civil Society and Governance in Nigeria: A Post 1960 Synopsis,"Civil Society and Consolidation of Democracy, Calabar: Cats Publishers

Odunayo Adams (2016). 5 African Presidents whose Fathers were also Presidents, Naija.News, retrieved from https://www.naija.com

Plamenatz John (1973). Democracy and Illusion: An Examination of Certain Aspects of ModernDemocracy, London: University Press

Reno, W. (1995). Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, Cambridge: University Press, Ch. 1

Sklar, R. L. (1979). "The Nature of Class Domination in Africa"Journal of Modern African Studies, 17(4), p. 540

The Economist (2016). Africa's Fragile Democracies, London, August 20 – 26, Vol. 420 (9003) p. 9, 26 – 28

Tordoff William (2002). Government and Politics in Africa, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Vanguard (2017). Gambia's Electoral Commission head goes into hiding, January 4, p. 44